Auction
Lab

Students receive a random private value (0–100) and submit a sealed bid. 10 rounds per session. Instructor panel reveals results with scatter plot and OLS trend line.

Same as the 2-bidder version but with 5 competing bidders. Optimal bid line shows the 4/5 × value Nash equilibrium prediction.

Vickrey-style auction with 2 bidders. The optimal bid line has slope 1 — reflecting the dominant strategy of bidding your true value.

Vickrey-style auction with 5 bidders. Optimal bid line slope of 1 — truthful bidding is the dominant strategy regardless of the number of bidders.

First-price sealed bid with a $25 entry fee. Equilibrium bid = v/2 − 1/(8v) for v > 50, else 0.

Second-price sealed bid with a $25 entry fee. Equilibrium bid = value for v > 50, else 0.

First-price sealed bid with a $50 reserve price. Equilibrium bid = v/2 + 1/(8v) for v > 50, else 0.

Second-price sealed bid with a $50 reserve price. Equilibrium bid = value for v > 50, else 0.